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Introduction	  	  	   After	  the	  events	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  and	  other	  actions	  taken	  by	  Germany,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  the	  lawful	  justification	  of	  military	  combat	  were	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  international	  community’s	  collective	  mind.	  	  International	  law	  placed	  restrictions	  on	  acceptable	  uses	  of	  force.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	  international	  law,	  the	  Suez	  Crisis	  shocked	  the	  global	  community.	  	  On	  July	  26,	  1956,	  President	  Gamul	  Abdul	  Nasser	  of	  Egypt	  announced	  the	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal.	  	  Only	  a	  few	  months	  later,	  after	  only	  a	  week	  of	  fighting,	  on	  November	  7,	  1956,	  Britain,	  France,	  Israel,	  and	  Egypt	  agreed	  to	  the	  ceasefire	  mandated	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council.	  	  These	  events	  were	  brought	  on	  by	  years	  of	  tension	  amongst	  multiple	  state	  actors,	  in	  a	  changing	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  environment	  and	  the	  beginnings	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  In	  order	  to	  end	  the	  hostilities,	  the	  first	  United	  Nations	  Emergency	  Force	  was	  created	  and	  called	  into	  action	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  the	  chaos.	  	  	  	   President	  Nasser’s	  decision	  to	  nationalize	  the	  Canal	  ignited	  the	  tensions	  between	  Egypt	  and	  the	  Western	  world	  due	  to	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	  the	  Canal	  in	  a	  growing	  global	  economy.	  	  The	  transportation	  of	  goods	  through	  the	  Canal	  made	  any	  change	  in	  how	  it	  was	  run	  very	  worrisome.	  	  As	  Nasser	  knew,	  “the	  Canal	  had	  become	  the	  vital	  artery	  for	  the	  flow	  of	  exports,	  imports,	  and	  shipping	  of	  many	  nations,	  and	  especially	  for	  Europe’s	  access	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  oil	  essential	  for	  its	  economy.	  	  Canal	  traffic,	  which	  had	  grown	  steadily,	  was	  expected	  to	  increase	  even	  faster	  in	  the	  future	  to	  meet	  Europe’s	  rapidly	  expanding	  oil	  needs”	  (Bowie	  2).	  	  Thus,	  the	  continued	  efficiency	  of	  the	  Canal	  was	  of	  the	  utmost	  importance	  to	  multiple	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maritime	  countries.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  Nasser	  was	  legally	  justified	  in	  his	  decision	  to	  nationalize	  the	  Canal,	  many	  other	  nations	  had	  a	  direct	  and	  indirect	  interest	  in	  the	  Canal.	  The	  Suez	  Canal	  was	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  international	  trade.	  	  Many	  states	  relied	  on	  the	  Canal	  for	  economic	  purposes,	  and	  had	  a	  vital	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  its	  success.	  	  	  	   While	  still	  in	  the	  beginning	  stages	  of	  its	  development,	  the	  United	  Nations	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  ending	  the	  conflict.	  Both	  the	  General	  Assembly	  and	  the	  Security	  Council	  were	  called	  into	  action.	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  youth	  of	  the	  organization	  and	  lacking	  of	  experience	  with	  utilizing	  its	  potential	  also	  made	  world	  leaders	  hesitant	  to	  test	  it	  out.	  	  Multiple	  factor	  were	  considered	  in	  how	  best	  to	  solve	  the	  Crisis,	  including	  “the	  validity	  of	  nationalization	  in	  international	  law,	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Canal	  Company,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Egyptians	  to	  run	  the	  Canal,	  the	  propriety	  of	  unilateral	  intervention,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  and	  the	  coherence	  of	  the	  Western	  Alliance”	  (Bowie	  25).	  	  Issues	  of	  legality	  and	  justification	  were	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  Crisis.	  	  	  Questions	  of	  Nasser’s	  legality	  in	  his	  decree	  were	  questioned,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  violation	  of	  international	  law	  by	  not	  allowing	  Israeli	  ships	  through	  the	  Canal.	  	  As	  the	  new	  beacon	  for	  international	  law,	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  created	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  international	  conflicts	  such	  as	  the	  Suez	  Crisis.	  	  	  
Background	  	  	   	  	   The	  years	  and	  months	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Crisis	  were	  filled	  with	  tension	  and	  conflicts	  of	  interest.	  	  With	  Egypt’s	  newfound	  independence	  as	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  state,	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political	  relationships	  with	  other	  countries	  were	  changing.	  	  	  Political	  agendas	  towards	  Egypt	  were	  altered	  greatly	  in	  the	  months	  before	  the	  nationalization.	  	  This	  was	  evident,	  for	  example,	  “in	  the	  period	  from	  March	  to	  July,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Britain	  had	  managed	  to	  work	  together	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  an	  immediate	  policy	  toward	  Nasser.	  	  Yet	  the	  divergence	  in	  their	  assessment	  of	  Nasser,	  and	  their	  aims	  in	  dealing	  with	  him,	  still	  remained,	  and	  would	  influence	  their	  handling	  of	  the	  Suez	  Crisis”	  (Louis	  196).	  	  Prime	  Minister	  Anthony	  Eden	  and	  President	  Dwight	  Eisenhower	  had	  different	  views	  on	  the	  threat	  level	  posed	  by	  Nasser	  as	  a	  leader;	  however	  neither	  was	  personally	  fond	  of	  him.	  	  Both	  leaders	  were	  concerned	  with	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  particularly	  Egypt,	  which	  was	  striving	  to	  be	  a	  regional	  power.	  	  	  	   Two	  personalities	  stand	  out	  over	  all	  others	  within	  the	  Crisis:	  they	  are	  Anthony	  Eden	  and	  Gamul	  Nasser.	  	  Nasser	  was	  a	  young	  politician	  with	  many	  political	  aspirations	  and	  desire	  for	  ever-­‐increasing	  power.	  	  He	  received	  widespread	  support	  from	  Egyptian	  citizens,	  craving	  to	  find	  their	  place	  in	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  world.	  	  As	  the	  country’s	  independence	  grew,	  “Egypt	  under	  Nasser	  entered	  the	  mainstream	  of	  international	  politics	  as	  a	  factor	  to	  be	  dealt	  with”	  (Louis	  32).	  	  His	  popularity	  and	  political	  support	  within	  his	  nation	  and	  among	  other	  Arab	  nations	  continued	  to	  give	  him	  strength	  in	  his	  role.	  	  On	  another	  continent,	  the	  British	  Empire	  was	  shrinking	  without	  its	  colonial	  holdings,	  causing	  fear	  to	  take	  root	  in	  Prime	  Minister	  Eden.	  	  While	  he	  accepted	  losing	  land	  holdings,	  he	  greatly	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  influence	  as	  part	  of	  continued	  British	  power.	  	  The	  Prime	  Minister’s	  mental	  condition	  at	  the	  time	  has	  come	  into	  question,	  “it	  is	  Eden’s	  state	  of	  mind	  –	  and	  the	  medicines	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that	  may	  have	  affected	  his	  judgment	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  Suez	  –	  which	  are	  critical”	  (Turner	  161).	  	  Due	  to	  medications	  he	  was	  taking,	  his	  personality	  was	  erratic,	  causing	  not	  only	  tensions	  with	  his	  advisors,	  but	  also	  a	  lack	  of	  popularity	  with	  the	  British	  people.	  	  He	  was	  nowhere	  near	  as	  popular	  with	  his	  citizens	  as	  Nasser	  was	  with	  his	  own,	  evident	  in	  the	  population’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  Crisis.	  	  Not	  only	  was	  there	  a	  colonial	  past	  between	  these	  two	  leaders,	  Egypt	  had	  a	  tense	  relationship	  with	  its	  neighbor,	  Israel.	  Since	  the	  creation	  of	  Israel	  as	  a	  state,	  the	  Arab	  world	  was	  slow	  in	  accepting	  its	  existence,	  to	  the	  point	  of	  military	  action.	  	  Before	  the	  announcement	  of	  nationalization,	  Israel	  and	  Egypt’s	  relationship	  was	  tense,	  with	  very	  little	  discussion	  between	  the	  two	  states.	  	  As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  other	  states	  within	  the	  region,	  “Egypt’s	  relations	  with	  Israel	  had	  of	  course	  been	  unfriendly	  since	  the	  hostilities	  and	  armistice	  following	  Israel’s	  creation	  in	  1948.	  	  Like	  other	  Arab	  states,	  Egypt	  denied	  Israel’s	  legitimacy	  and	  demanded	  its	  surrender	  of	  considerable	  territory	  and	  restitution	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  refugees”	  (Bowie	  9).	  	  Due	  to	  their	  perceived	  state	  of	  war,	  Egypt	  had	  refused	  to	  allow	  Israeli	  ships	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  Canal.	  This	  exception	  would	  be	  continued	  once	  Nasser	  nationalized	  the	  Canal.	  	  	   	  The	  Suez	  Canal	  Company	  ensured	  the	  smooth	  running	  of	  the	  Canal.	  	  Investments	  in	  the	  Company	  were	  open	  internationally,	  with	  Britain	  owning	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  shares.	  	  Within	  the	  agreement	  the	  “Company	  concession	  was	  to	  expire	  in	  twelve	  years”	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Crisis	  (Louis	  202).	  	  This	  meant	  that	  in	  twelve	  years,	  unless	  another	  agreement	  was	  erected,	  the	  Company’s	  ownership	  would	  transfer	  to	  Egypt.	  	  Nasser’s	  actions	  in	  1956	  were	  a	  fast	  forward	  to	  what	  was	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an	  expected	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Canal;	  however,	  many	  questioned	  whether	  he	  had	  the	  legal	  right	  to	  not	  wait	  the	  final	  twelve	  years.	  	  	  Based	  on	  a	  presumed	  illegal	  decision,	  Britain	  and	  France	  acted	  upon	  “the	  unstated	  premise	  of	  the	  mission…that	  the	  Egyptians	  were	  unreliable	  and	  unable	  to	  operate	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  without	  international	  supervision,	  it	  was	  doomed	  to	  failure”	  (Kingseed	  71).	  	  No	  matter	  their	  ulterior	  motives,	  both	  Britain	  and	  France	  had	  a	  deep	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  the	  continued	  success	  of	  the	  Canal.	  	  This	  included	  other	  considerations	  in	  how	  best	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  	   Before	  military	  retaliation	  were	  multiple	  attempts	  at	  a	  diplomatic	  solution.	  	  Two	  major	  discussions	  occurred	  to	  attempt	  to	  create	  an	  agreement	  agreeable	  to	  all	  parties.	  	  The	  first	  “conference	  convened	  in	  London	  from	  August	  16-­‐23”	  (Kingseed	  66)	  and	  “the	  Second	  Suez	  Canal	  Conference	  met	  in	  London	  from	  September	  19	  to	  21”	  (Kingseed	  75).	  	  Both	  France	  and	  Britain	  were	  involved	  in	  these	  conversations	  despite	  their	  eventual	  actions.	  The	  eventual	  result	  of	  Nasser’s	  nationalization	  only	  became	  known	  months	  later	  that	  “the	  British	  and	  the	  French	  had	  conspired	  with	  Israel,	  deliberately	  misinformed	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  initiated	  hostilities	  at	  a	  time	  when	  they	  felt	  Eisenhower	  would	  be	  powerless	  to	  act	  due	  to	  the	  presidential	  election”	  (Kingseed	  102).	  	  How	  Great	  Britain,	  France,	  and	  Israel	  reached	  the	  point	  of	  military	  action,	  going	  against	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  concerning	  land	  and	  a	  Canal,	  has	  many	  complexities	  and	  ulterior	  motives.	  	  Each	  of	  the	  countries	  involved	  had	  their	  own	  reasons	  for	  policy	  choices,	  which	  all	  ultimately	  came	  to	  a	  head	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  the	  Crisis	  to	  a	  quick	  and	  final	  end.	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   As	  the	  colonial	  past	  was	  left	  behind,	  Egypt	  gained	  power	  within	  the	  Arab	  world.	  	  Part	  of	  the	  rise	  to	  power	  was	  Gamul	  Nasser’s	  own	  climb	  up	  the	  ladder	  to	  become	  Egypt’s	  second	  president.	  	  As	  a	  true	  politician,	  Nasser	  knew	  the	  feelings	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  people	  and	  “had	  effectively	  made	  Arabism	  a	  protest	  movement	  against	  Western	  dominance	  in	  the	  region”	  (Louis	  37).	  	  Egypt	  and	  Nasser	  strove	  to	  become	  the	  central	  Arab	  power.	  	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  their	  independence,	  Egypt	  negotiated	  with	  Great	  Britain,	  a	  withdrawal	  of	  British	  troops.	  In	  1954	  Britain	  agreed	  to	  begin	  withdrawing	  from	  Egypt	  as	  a	  colonial	  power.	  	  Great	  Britain	  extracted	  a	  guarantee	  that	  “if	  Turkey	  or	  an	  Arab	  state	  were	  attacked,	  Britain	  would	  have	  the	  right	  to	  activate	  the	  base”	  (Louis,	  66).	  	  It	  only	  took	  two	  years	  for	  the	  country	  to	  completely	  withdraw	  its	  presence.	  	  Tensions	  with	  the	  Western	  world	  were	  not	  the	  only	  concerns	  for	  the	  Egyptian	  government,	  however.	  	   Despite	  an	  armistice,	  the	  presence	  of	  Israel	  was	  not	  accepted	  by	  Egypt.	  	  Instead	  of	  recognizing	  the	  Israeli	  statehood,	  “Egypt	  considered	  itself	  to	  be	  in	  a	  state	  of	  war	  with	  Israel,	  abided	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  Arab	  boycott	  on	  any	  diplomatic	  contacts	  with	  Israel”	  (Louis	  73).	  	  Part	  of	  this	  tension	  was	  refusing	  to	  allow	  Israeli	  ships	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  Suez	  Canal.	  	  The	  Canal	  was	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Canal	  Company;	  however,	  Egyptian	  military	  and	  police	  forces	  enforced	  the	  Egyptian	  position.	  	  Any	  communication	  with	  Israel	  was	  made	  through	  third	  parties	  and	  other	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countries.	  	  As	  Egypt	  emerged	  as	  an	  Arab	  power,	  the	  vestiges	  of	  colonialism	  were	  still	  a	  sore	  point	  for	  her	  citizens.	  The	  Egyptian	  people	  were	  very	  conscious	  of	  their	  colonial	  past	  and	  wanted	  to	  move	  beyond	  being	  controlled	  by	  a	  Western	  power.	  	  Influence	  and	  power	  within	  not	  only	  the	  Western	  world	  but	  also	  the	  entire	  international	  community	  was	  part	  of	  their	  new	  agenda.	  	  This	  was	  also	  part	  of	  Nasser’s	  personal	  agenda.	  	  It	  became	  clear	  that	  “Nasser	  was	  by	  no	  means	  a	  passive	  man:	  he	  aspired	  to	  become	  the	  leader	  of	  a	  vast	  federation	  of	  Arab	  countries	  embracing	  the	  Maghrib,	  and	  to	  erase	  Israel	  from	  the	  map”	  (Louis	  135).	  	  Military	  power	  was	  important	  in	  achieving	  these	  goals	  in	  light	  of	  Israeli	  military	  strength	  and	  the	  military	  tensions	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  In	  order	  to	  counter	  the	  perceived	  threat	  of	  Israel,	  Egypt	  desired	  a	  strong	  military	  arsenal.	  	  To	  achieve	  this,	  “Nasser	  appealed	  to	  the	  United	  States	  for	  a	  shipment	  of	  arms	  to	  counter	  Israel’s	  growing	  military	  power	  and	  apparent	  willingness	  to	  see	  its	  army	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  policy”	  (Kingseed	  32).	  	  Due	  to	  a	  previous	  agreement,	  the	  U.S.	  refused	  to	  arm	  Egypt,	  in	  order	  to	  control	  the	  Cold	  War	  atmosphere.	  	  However,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  chose	  to	  supply	  Egypt.	  	  It	  became	  clear	  “that	  weaponry,	  plus	  the	  Soviet	  political	  backing	  that	  went	  with	  it,	  had	  given	  Egypt	  formidable	  military	  might	  and	  her	  president…a	  tremendous	  feeling	  of	  confidence”	  (Dayan	  183).	  	  Military	  power	  was	  not	  the	  only	  objective	  for	  Nasser	  and	  Egypt;	  financial	  power	  was	  also	  part	  of	  the	  plan	  for	  the	  country’s	  rise.	  	  As	  with	  military	  supplies,	  Egypt	  called	  on	  Western	  powers	  to	  support	  its	  endeavor.	  	  	  Nasser	  dreamed	  of	  building	  the	  Aswan	  High	  Dam	  and	  using	  the	  revenues	  to	  increase	  the	  financial	  power	  of	  Egypt.	  	  Despite	  desiring	  a	  speedy	  withdrawal,	  Egypt	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made	  “an	  appeal	  to	  Britain	  to	  help	  push	  ahead	  Nasser’s	  ambition	  to	  revolutionize	  Egypt’s	  economy	  and	  to	  release	  the	  country	  from	  its	  poverty	  trap.	  	  The	  means	  for	  achieving	  this	  was	  to	  trap	  the	  flood	  waters	  of	  the	  Nile	  behind	  the	  Aswan	  High	  Dam”	  (Turner	  150).	  The	  Aswan	  High	  Dam	  was	  Egypt’s	  next	  great	  project	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  its	  importance	  within	  the	  international	  community.	  	  Funding	  from	  the	  United	  States	  as	  well	  as	  loans	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  were	  also	  necessary	  to	  fund	  this	  large	  endeavor.	  	  Before	  plans	  and	  the	  funding	  were	  finalized,	  negotiations	  concerning	  how	  the	  revenues	  would	  be	  split	  went	  back	  and	  forth.	  	  Due	  to	  paranoia	  concerning	  their	  perceived	  revenue	  from	  the	  Suez	  Canal,	  “negotiations	  dragged	  on	  for	  months,	  with	  Nasser	  objecting	  strenuously	  to	  the	  fiscal	  safeguards	  requested”	  (Bowie	  11).	  	  	  Egyptians	  did	  not	  want	  to	  lose	  out	  on	  money	  that	  was	  rightfully	  theirs	  due	  to	  greedy	  Westerners.	  	  This	  back	  and	  forth	  could	  not	  go	  on	  forever.	  Due	  to	  their	  post-­‐colonial	  psyche,	  debate	  over	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  loans	  was	  very	  tense.	  Nasser’s	  eventual	  agreement	  to	  the	  terms	  came	  at	  too	  late	  of	  a	  date.	  	  The	  Egyptian	  President’s	  proud	  character	  made	  negotiations	  difficult.	  	  The	  financing	  countries	  no	  longer	  had	  the	  popular	  support,	  nor	  the	  desire	  to	  fund	  the	  project.	  	  This	  became	  clear,	  and	  “by	  the	  end	  of	  June,	  Nasser	  had	  given	  up	  on	  Western	  promises…if	  money	  was	  not	  forthcoming…he	  was	  prepared	  to	  risk	  confrontation	  with	  America,	  Britain	  and	  France	  to	  achieve	  his	  ends”	  (Turner	  176).	  	  For	  a	  few	  months,	  Nasser	  had	  been	  considering	  a	  contingency	  plan.	  	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  fund	  the	  Dam,	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  would	  be	  nationalized,	  giving	  Egypt	  all	  of	  the	  revenues.	  	   Nationalization	  of	  the	  Canal	  was	  a	  last	  resort,	  but	  had	  been	  thought	  out	  by	  Nasser.	  	  Despite	  the	  possible	  international	  retaliation	  “this	  act	  would	  procure	  for	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him	  both	  the	  revenge	  for	  his	  wounded	  prestige,	  which	  meant	  so	  much	  to	  him,	  and	  the	  financial	  assets	  needed	  for	  the	  great	  Aswan	  project”	  (Lacouture	  and	  Hofstadter	  166).	  	  Losing	  Western	  funding	  was	  a	  blow	  to	  Nasser’s	  ego,	  which	  he	  needed	  to	  counteract	  by	  some	  act	  to	  show	  the	  world	  that	  Egypt	  could	  be	  independent.	  	  This	  was	  not	  only	  a	  concern	  for	  Nasser,	  but	  also	  the	  Egyptian	  people	  who	  as	  a	  whole	  still	  remembered	  colonialism.	  	  Nasser	  knew	  that	  “its	  nationalization	  conformed	  to	  the	  national	  aspirations	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  people”	  (Louis	  165).	  	  	  The	  act	  also	  saved	  the	  pride	  of	  the	  newly	  independent	  Egyptians,	  not	  just	  their	  leader.	  	  In	  order	  to	  guarantee	  the	  support	  of	  his	  citizens,	  Nasser	  crafted	  an	  impassioned	  speech	  to	  bring	  out	  all	  of	  these	  emotions.	  Nasser	  played	  on	  multiple	  insecurities	  during	  his	  announcement	  of	  the	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Canal,	  ensuring	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  people	  in	  his	  endeavor.	  	  	  During	  the	  “three-­‐hour	  speech	  that	  delighted	  the	  crowd,	  the	  Egyptian	  president	  proclaimed	  the	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  Company.	  	  Even	  as	  he	  was	  speaking,	  Egyptian	  forces	  occupied	  the	  various	  company	  installations”,	  immediately	  taking	  action	  (Kingseed	  41).	  	  In	  the	  speech,	  Nasser	  spoke	  of	  the	  unfair	  share	  in	  profits	  that	  the	  Western	  world	  had	  forced	  upon	  Egypt	  when	  they	  were	  a	  Colonial	  power,	  depriving	  and	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  country	  and	  its	  people.	  	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  speech	  was	  not	  a	  coincidence	  either,	  as	  it	  “mark[ed]	  the	  fourth	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  Revolution”	  (Bowie	  1).	  	  All	  of	  these	  factors	  almost	  guaranteed	  the	  support	  that	  was	  necessary	  for	  Nasser	  to	  defend	  his	  actions	  to	  the	  international	  community.	  	  Legality	  was	  not	  an	  issue	  for	  the	  Egyptians,	  Nasser	  was	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only	  speeding	  up	  the	  process,	  and	  in	  only	  a	  few	  more	  years	  the	  Canal	  would	  have	  belonged	  to	  Egypt.	  	  	  	   Understood	  as	  part	  of	  the	  nationalization,	  was	  the	  requirement	  that	  Egypt	  must	  run	  the	  Canal	  as	  smoothly	  as	  it	  had	  been	  run	  prior,	  and	  continue	  to	  allow	  all	  states	  to	  travel	  through	  it.	  	  However,	  Egypt	  continued	  to	  refuse	  Israel	  access	  to	  the	  waterway.	  	  This	  surprised	  no	  one	  within	  the	  international	  community.	  	  While	  he	  expected	  some	  blowback	  from	  the	  Western	  powers,	  “Nasser’s	  strategy	  was	  to	  escape	  from	  any	  direct	  confrontation	  and	  thereby	  preserve	  the	  nationalization	  without	  war”	  (Louis	  166).	  	  Direct	  military	  action	  was	  to	  be	  avoided	  if	  possible.	  	  This	  was	  considered	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  nationalizing	  the	  Canal.	  	  After	  the	  announcement,	  “an	  ever	  watchful	  Nasser	  calculated	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  war	  fell	  with	  every	  week	  that	  passed”	  (Turner	  197).	  	  As	  each	  week	  went	  by,	  Nasser	  felt	  that	  Egypt	  and	  the	  Canal	  were	  safer	  than	  the	  last.	  	  By	  continuing	  to	  run	  the	  Canal	  as	  well	  as	  it	  had	  been	  before	  the	  nationalization,	  Nasser	  believed	  he	  was	  continuing	  to	  decrease	  the	  chances	  of	  military	  retaliation	  from	  the	  West.	  	  Egypt	  was	  successful	  in	  its	  endeavor	  to	  continue	  the	  smooth	  running	  of	  the	  Canal	  and	  “there	  was	  no	  indication	  that	  Nasser	  was	  about	  to	  interrupt	  the	  flow	  of	  oil”	  (Turner	  237).	  	  Receiving	  oil	  transported	  through	  the	  Canal	  was	  very	  important	  for	  Great	  Britain	  and	  other	  Western	  countries.	  	  Despite	  these	  efforts,	  Nasser	  was	  unsuccessful	  in	  stopping	  the	  Western	  world	  from	  protesting	  the	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Canal.	  	   Efforts	  made	  by	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Great	  Britain	  to	  set	  up	  a	  conference	  for	  all	  countries	  concerned	  with	  the	  Canal	  in	  order	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  solution	  acceptable	  to	  all	  resulted	  in	  two	  conferences	  held	  in	  London.	  	  Egypt	  was	  invited	  to	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this	  meeting,	  however	  “Nasser	  issued	  a	  lengthy	  statement	  in	  which	  he	  rejected	  the	  invitation	  to	  the	  London	  conference	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  body	  was	  attempting	  to	  interfere	  in	  Egypt’s	  domestic	  affairs”	  (Kingseed	  56).	  	  Having	  an	  international	  body	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  Canal	  was	  not	  acceptable	  to	  Nasser.	  	  He	  refused	  all	  requests	  and	  suggestions	  made,	  as	  they	  would	  all	  transfer	  authority	  from	  Egypt	  to	  an	  international	  body.	  	  The	  Egyptian	  government	  was	  unaware	  of	  Great	  Britain,	  France,	  and	  Israel’s	  discussions	  behind	  the	  scenes	  for	  a	  military	  confrontation.	  	   Only	  until	  a	  few	  days	  before	  did	  Nasser	  understand	  how	  far	  Britain	  and	  France	  would	  go	  to	  place	  the	  Canal	  under	  international	  control.	  	  After	  seeing	  the	  movement	  of	  troops,	  “Nasser	  took	  the	  threat	  of	  an	  Anglo-­‐French	  invasion	  seriously,	  and	  then	  only	  after	  forcing	  himself	  to	  accept	  what	  seemed	  a	  ludicrous	  proposition,	  that	  France	  and	  Britain…were	  ready	  to	  sacrifice	  their	  remaining	  Arab	  friends	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  strip	  of	  water”	  (Turner	  323).	  	  However,	  Israel’s	  attack	  was	  much	  less	  surprising	  as	  Egypt	  considered	  itself	  still	  in	  a	  state	  of	  war	  with	  the	  newly	  founded	  state.	  	  Once	  Israel	  invaded,	  Nasser	  “ordered	  a	  complete	  withdrawal	  of	  all	  troops	  east	  of	  the	  Canal	  to	  prevent	  their	  encirclement	  by	  the	  Israelis	  from	  the	  east	  and	  the	  British	  and	  the	  French	  from	  the	  rear”	  (Louis	  168).	  	  Despite	  the	  Soviet	  weaponry,	  Egyptian	  training	  was	  sub	  par	  in	  understanding	  how	  to	  utilize	  it	  for	  military	  success.	  	  In	  order	  to	  protect	  his	  citizens,	  Nasser	  pulled	  out	  of	  the	  Canal,	  but	  not	  before	  sinking	  two	  ships	  in	  order	  to	  stop	  traffic.	  	  For	  pulling	  out	  of	  the	  funding	  and	  coming	  to	  their	  aid	  once	  the	  colonial	  countries	  attacked	  the	  Canal,	  Egypt	  ultimately	  blamed	  the	  United	  States	  for	  the	  Crisis.	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   Since	  its	  creation	  as	  a	  state,	  Israel	  had	  to	  fight	  for	  its	  legitimacy	  with	  other	  Arab	  states.	  	  Instead	  of	  diplomatic	  means,	  the	  Israeli	  government	  cultivated	  military	  strength	  in	  order	  to	  fight	  the	  opposition.	  	  Both	  the	  government	  and	  the	  people	  “held	  to	  the	  doctrine	  that	  attack	  is	  the	  best	  form	  of	  defense,	  a	  policy	  that	  in	  relation	  to	  Egypt	  found	  increasing	  favor	  with	  Israeli	  politicians	  of	  all	  parties”	  (Turner	  157).	  Force	  was	  emphasized	  over	  diplomatic	  solutions	  with	  other	  governments	  within	  the	  Arab	  world.	  	  Due	  to	  their	  proximity	  to	  each	  other,	  and	  Egypt’s	  history	  of	  refusing	  Israeli	  ships	  passage	  through	  the	  Canal,	  tensions	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Israel	  were	  at	  a	  constant	  high.	  	  For	  Israel,	  the	  issue	  was	  that	  the	  Israeli’s	  believed	  that	  historically	  they	  owned	  the	  Sinai	  Peninsula,	  rather	  than	  a	  true	  contention	  with	  the	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Canal.	  	  However,	  this	  gave	  Israel	  an	  opportunity	  to	  partner	  with	  Western	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  their	  end	  goal.	  	  Nor	  was	  removing	  Nasser	  from	  power	  a	  top	  priority.	  	  As	  Moshe	  Dayan,	  the	  military	  leader	  at	  the	  time,	  stated,	  “in	  capturing	  Sinai,	  we	  would	  gain	  our	  objectives	  even	  if	  Nasser	  remained	  in	  power”	  (Dayan	  201).	  	  As	  per	  usual	  policy,	  Israel	  was	  ready	  and	  willing	  to	  take	  military	  action	  against	  Egypt.	  	  The	  first	  country	  to	  agree	  with	  Israel	  was	  France.	  	  	  	   Due	  to	  their	  interests	  in	  Algeria,	  France	  was	  prepared	  to	  join	  with	  Israel	  in	  taking	  military	  action	  against	  Egypt.	  	  While	  Britain	  was	  interested	  in	  considering	  the	  option,	  they	  were	  initially	  hesitant	  to	  definitively	  become	  part	  of	  the	  plan	  to	  invade	  Egypt.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  Israel	  and	  France	  began	  with	  “the	  large-­‐scale	  deliveries	  of	  arms	  from	  France	  had	  started	  to	  arrive	  in	  Israel	  shortly	  before	  the	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nationalization	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal,	  which	  would	  redress	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  Israel	  and	  Egypt”	  (Louis	  150).	  	  These	  deliveries	  violated	  the	  tripartite	  agreement	  between	  France,	  Britain,	  and	  the	  U.S.,	  which	  had	  caused	  the	  U.S.	  to	  refuse	  Egypt’s	  request	  for	  weaponry.	  	  In	  beginning	  discussions	  of	  a	  possible	  military	  action,	  “France	  was	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  policy	  of	  action.	  	  Britain’s	  Prime	  Minister	  Eden	  also	  favored	  military	  measures,	  but	  he	  faced	  serious	  opposition	  inside	  his	  own	  country”	  (Dayan	  184).	  	  Discussions	  with	  France	  were	  mainly	  without	  British	  involvement,	  in	  case	  Britain	  did	  not	  end	  up	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  military	  action.	  	  However,	  Israel	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  refusal	  to	  address	  the	  nationalization	  militarily,	  and	  wanted	  to	  continue	  their	  relationship	  without	  upsetting	  the	  Americans.	  	  In	  order	  “to	  allay	  the	  opposition	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  was	  ready	  to	  forgo	  many	  strategic	  advantages	  which	  a	  preventive	  strike	  might	  give,	  and	  allow	  the	  Egyptians	  to	  take	  the	  initiative”	  (Louis	  147).	  	  This	  connection	  with	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  stop	  Israel	  from	  military	  talks	  with	  France,	  however.	  	  	  	   Israel	  was	  aware	  of	  what	  was	  holding	  France	  back	  from	  a	  full	  commitment.	  	  Instead	  of	  offering	  a	  commitment,	  “it	  was	  clear	  that	  France	  could	  not	  finalize	  her	  plans	  for	  a	  Suez	  campaign	  until	  she	  had	  Britain’s	  decision:	  (Dayan	  196).	  	  Israel	  and	  France	  decided	  to	  make	  plans	  in	  the	  case	  that	  Britain	  would	  not	  take	  part,	  but	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  French	  would	  rather	  have	  the	  British	  involved	  in	  any	  kind	  of	  military	  attack.	  	  During	  the	  talks	  with	  Britain	  and	  France,	  tensions	  between	  Israel	  and	  Egypt	  continued	  to	  escalate	  as	  they	  played	  a	  back-­‐and-­‐forth	  game.	  	  	  In	  particular,	  “the	  Israeli	  raid	  on	  Gaza	  further	  aggravated	  matters”	  (Louis	  79).	  	  Israel	  also	  attempted	  to	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pass	  goods	  and	  ships	  through	  the	  Canal,	  to	  see	  how	  far	  they	  could	  go.	  	  Tensions	  continued	  to	  escalate	  between	  the	  two	  states	  as	  Israel	  waited	  for	  Britain	  and	  France	  to	  decide	  on	  military	  action.	  	   As	  plans	  began	  to	  be	  finalized	  among	  the	  three	  states,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  Israel	  would	  be	  asked	  to	  begin	  fighting	  alone.	  	  The	  Israeli	  government	  was	  “concerned	  over	  the	  eventuality	  of	  full-­‐scale	  fighting	  going	  on	  for	  two	  days,	  in	  which	  case	  Israel	  would	  be	  condemned	  and	  might	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  confrontation	  with	  volunteers	  from	  the	  Soviet	  block”	  (Bar-­‐Zohar	  239).	  	  As	  the	  plan	  emerged,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  Britain	  and	  France	  wanted	  to	  appear	  as	  heroes,	  ameliorating	  the	  situation	  between	  Israel	  and	  Egypt.	  	  This	  arrangement	  for	  Israel	  to	  act	  first	  and	  alone	  required	  a	  “price	  for	  Israel’s	  participation:	  England	  and	  France	  were	  to	  recognize	  Israel’s	  right	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  certain	  sections	  of	  Sinai	  after	  the	  fighting	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  freedom	  of	  navigation”	  (Bar-­‐Zohar	  241).	  	  Israel	  was	  willing	  only	  if	  the	  state	  could	  be	  guaranteed	  its	  end	  goals.	  	  However,	  this	  action	  placed	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  States	  at	  risk.	  	  	  	   For	  the	  gamble	  to	  be	  worthwhile,	  the	  Israelis	  needed	  to	  be	  prepared.	  	  While	  the	  weapons	  were	  not	  as	  advanced	  as	  those	  in	  Egypt’s	  possession,	  the	  Israeli	  military	  had	  the	  training	  to	  understand	  how	  to	  handle	  and	  utilize	  what	  the	  government	  was	  given.	  	  	  As	  the	  international	  conferences	  failed	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  solution,	  the	  three	  parties	  decided	  upon	  a	  final	  military	  plan.	  	  The	  main	  elements	  of	  the	  plan	  were	  “an	  Israeli	  invasion	  of	  Sinai,	  reaching	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  within	  two	  days,	  whereupon	  an	  Anglo-­‐French	  ultimatum	  would	  be	  presented	  to	  both	  sides	  to	  pull	  back	  from	  the	  canal.	  	  If	  the	  Egyptians	  refused,	  France	  and	  Britain	  would	  invade,	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occupying	  the	  Canal	  Zone	  and	  overthrowing	  Nasser”	  (Bar-­‐Zohar	  238).	  	  All	  three	  parties	  knew	  that	  Egypt	  would	  refuse	  the	  ultimatum,	  guaranteeing	  the	  need	  for	  France	  and	  Britain	  to	  invade.	  	  This	  increased	  Israel’s	  willingness	  to	  invade	  first.	  	  	  Once	  finalized	  Israel	  was	  only	  waiting	  for	  the	  agreed	  upon	  date	  to	  begin	  its	  military	  assault.	  	  As	  planned	  “the	  attack	  began	  with	  the	  Israeli	  invasion	  of	  Sinai	  on	  29	  October	  1956,	  and	  on	  5	  November	  as	  prearranged,	  Britain	  and	  France	  intervened”	  (Louis	  38).	  	  However,	  once	  Israel	  began	  its	  attack	  emergency	  sessions	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  were	  convened.	  	  Despite	  the	  Anglo-­‐French-­‐Israeli	  plan,	  the	  UN	  became	  involved,	  making	  Britain	  and	  France’s	  actions	  unnecessary	  to	  the	  international	  community.	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Great	  Britain	  	  	   	  After	  the	  destruction	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  Great	  Britain	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  rebuilding	  to	  accomplish	  at	  home,	  taking	  time	  and	  money	  away	  from	  the	  vast	  British	  empire	  of	  colonial	  holdings.	  	  As	  the	  country	  began	  ending	  its	  rule	  as	  a	  colonial	  power,	  it	  still	  wanted	  to	  retain	  power	  and	  influence	  in	  these	  areas,	  including	  Egypt.	  	  The	  British	  government	  wholeheartedly	  agreed	  and	  desired	  to	  pull	  out	  of	  Egypt,	  but	  did	  not	  want	  to	  lose	  their	  influence	  within	  the	  country	  and	  the	  over	  all	  Middle	  East	  area.	  	  Prime	  Minister	  Eden	  “rejected	  out	  of	  hand	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  continued	  British	  occupation”	  (Louis	  53).	  	  Britain	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  reenter	  in	  a	  military	  capacity	  if	  any	  British	  allies	  were	  being	  attacked.	  	  However,	  the	  government	  knew	  that	  “great	  care	  would	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  avoid	  the	  impression	  of	  a	  ‘complete	  surrender’	  to	  the	  Egyptians”	  (Louis	  67).	  	  One	  of	  the	  ways	  Britain	  was	  to	  remained	  involved	  was	  the	  funding	  of	  the	  Aswan	  High	  Dam.	  	  However,	  “with	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  American	  financial	  support,	  Great	  Britain	  quickly	  followed	  suit”	  (Kingseed	  40).	  	  	  The	  British	  government	  as	  well	  was	  growing	  tired	  of	  the	  back-­‐and-­‐forth	  of	  negotiations	  with	  Nasser.	  	  Eden	  was	  all	  too	  willing	  to	  end	  negotiations	  due	  to	  his	  dislike	  of	  Egypt’s	  leader.	  	  	  	   President	  Nasser’s	  proud	  personality	  found	  him	  few	  friends	  in	  the	  Western	  world.	  	  However,	  few	  seemed	  to	  dislike	  him	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  Prime	  Minister	  Eden	  did.	  	  As	  time	  went	  on	  and	  Great	  Britain	  pulled	  out	  of	  Egypt,	  Eden	  began	  to	  see	  the	  benefits	  of	  removing	  Nasser	  from	  power.	  	  	  The	  government	  was	  not	  fond	  of	  the	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Egyptian	  president	  and	  “concluded	  that	  Nasser	  was	  now	  a	  virtual	  Soviet	  tool,	  seeking	  to	  dominate	  the	  region	  and	  its	  vital	  oil,	  and	  to	  undermine	  all	  Western	  influence	  and	  alliances”	  (Louis	  191).	  	  Eden	  had	  personal	  tensions	  with	  Nasser,	  search	  for	  any	  cause	  to	  unseat	  Nasser’s	  government,	  without	  considering	  the	  consequences.	  	  The	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  became	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Eden	  to	  achieve	  his	  goal.	  	  	  	   The	  British	  government	  did	  not	  see	  Egypt’s	  action	  as	  legal,	  stating	  that	  the	  country	  was	  taking	  control	  of	  an	  international	  waterway.	  	  Re-­‐colonizing	  Egypt	  Britain’s	  intention,	  instead	  an	  international	  body	  was	  desired	  in	  order	  to	  run	  the	  Canal	  so	  that	  no	  one	  country	  would	  be	  able	  to	  manipulate	  the	  area	  for	  their	  own	  interests.	  	  Eden	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  “the	  official	  British	  position	  was	  that	  no	  arrangements	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  could	  be	  acceptable	  to	  Great	  Britain	  that	  would	  leave	  it	  in	  the	  unfettered	  control	  of	  a	  single	  power	  that	  could	  exploit	  it	  purely	  for	  purposes	  of	  national	  policy”	  (Kingseed	  65).	  	  This	  was	  the	  overall	  Western	  policy,	  however	  the	  United	  States	  emphasized	  diplomatic	  means	  to	  solve	  the	  tension.	  	  	  	   Despite	  American	  reluctance	  to	  military	  intervention,	  Britain,	  and	  more	  specifically	  Eden,	  saw	  this	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  not	  only	  have	  the	  Canal	  be	  placed	  under	  international	  control,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  chance	  to	  remove	  Nasser	  and	  set	  up	  a	  government	  more	  favorable	  to	  Western	  objectives.	  	  Before	  a	  military	  plan	  was	  decided	  upon,	  Britain	  hosted	  the	  London	  Conferences	  in	  order	  to	  find	  a	  diplomatic	  solution.	  	  However,	  “the	  Cabinet	  [was]	  unanimous	  that	  if	  economic	  and	  political	  pressure	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  desired	  result	  we	  must	  be	  prepared	  to	  use	  force”	  (Lloyd	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84).	  	  As	  time	  went	  on,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  Egypt	  was	  not	  bending	  to	  economic	  or	  political	  pressure.	  	  Britain	  was	  caught	  between	  the	  policy	  of	  its	  two	  major	  allies,	  “on	  one	  hand,	  the	  Americans’	  refusal	  to	  participate	  in	  any	  intervention;	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  French	  determination	  to	  intervene”	  (Louis	  140).	  	  Aligning	  with	  the	  French	  ultimately	  won	  due	  to	  their	  alignment	  with	  removing	  Nasser	  from	  power.	  	  In	  Eden’s	  eyes,	  diplomacy	  had	  failed,	  thus	  military	  action	  was	  the	  next	  viable	  step	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  British	  government	  felt	  the	  legality	  of	  any	  military	  action	  must	  be	  considered;	  however,	  Eden	  was	  not	  as	  concerned.	  	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  parties	  were	  happy	  and	  that	  “illegality	  [was]	  to	  be	  avoided,	  President	  Nasser	  must	  contribute	  to	  his	  own	  ruin”	  (Louis	  114).	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  military	  plan,	  this	  meant	  that	  Israel	  would	  be	  the	  first	  to	  take	  action,	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  Britain	  and	  France	  to	  be	  justified	  in	  their	  own	  military	  action,	  when	  Egypt	  refused	  to	  back	  away	  from	  the	  Canal.	  	  However,	  in	  preparing	  for	  a	  military	  attack	  it	  became	  clear	  “the	  troops	  were	  in	  a	  poor	  state	  of	  readiness,	  [and]	  the	  military	  hardware	  was	  in	  an	  even	  sorrier	  condition”	  (Turner	  212).	  	  Thus,	  military	  intervention	  was	  not	  possible	  immediately;	  it	  would	  take	  time	  to	  prepare.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  it	  took	  to	  prepare	  and	  agree	  to	  an	  invasion,	  many	  within	  the	  government	  began	  to	  have	  doubts.	  	   The	  British	  population	  was	  originally	  as	  enraged	  about	  the	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Canal	  as	  the	  government	  was.	  	  However,	  against	  Eden’s	  own	  desires,	  “public	  and	  parliamentary	  support	  for	  his	  Suez	  policy	  began	  to	  deteriorate	  by	  mid-­‐August”	  (Kingseed	  65).	  	  However,	  this	  did	  not	  end	  Eden’s	  communications	  with	  Israel	  and	  France.	  	  Military	  plans	  were	  being	  finalized	  in	  order	  to	  begin	  at	  the	  end	  of	  October.	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Eden	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  come	  to	  their	  aid	  as	  the	  Americans	  did	  in	  both	  World	  Wars.	  	  While	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  “United	  States	  public	  opinion	  was	  not	  prepared	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  using	  force”,	  Eden	  believed	  that	  they	  would	  later	  support	  helping	  the	  British	  (Lloyd	  88).	  	  Neither	  public	  opinion,	  nor	  American	  objections	  was	  going	  to	  stop	  Eden	  from	  his	  desire	  to	  remove	  Nasser	  from	  office.	  	  	  	   The	  relationship	  with	  America	  was	  not	  only	  political,	  but	  also	  personal.	  	  Eden	  and	  Eisenhower	  were	  in	  direct	  contact	  by	  letter	  for	  many	  years.	  	  Despite	  this	  personal	  relationship,	  “as	  soon	  as	  Eden	  formally	  approved	  collusion	  with	  France	  and	  Israel,	  open	  communication	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  ceased”	  (Kingseed	  82).	  	  Eisenhower	  was	  kept	  in	  the	  dark	  concerning	  Britain’s	  actions.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  veto,	  protecting	  Egypt,	  Eden	  saw	  UN	  refusal	  in	  a	  different	  light.	  	  With	  the	  knowledge	  that	  Egypt	  had	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Soviet’s	  vote,	  “the	  condition	  of	  United	  Nations	  approval	  for	  the	  use	  of	  force	  by	  Britain	  and	  France	  was	  equivalent	  to	  denying	  its	  use”	  (Eden	  445).	  	  Thus,	  if	  the	  Security	  Council	  passed	  the	  resolution	  it	  was	  approval,	  and	  if	  it	  was	  not	  passed	  Eden	  believed	  that	  all	  members,	  except	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  were	  in	  support,	  thus	  giving	  legitimacy	  to	  future	  British	  actions.	  	  Eden	  also	  received	  support	  at	  home	  when	  “on	  25	  October	  the	  intervention	  plan	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  British	  Cabinet,	  seemingly	  without	  major	  objection”	  (Bowie	  59).	  	  Britain	  was	  moving	  forward	  with	  its	  plans	  along	  with	  France	  and	  Israel,	  with	  what	  appeared	  to	  be	  international	  and	  national	  support.	  	  	   Due	  to	  swift	  and	  decisive	  military	  action,	  few	  civilians	  were	  harmed	  during	  the	  Crisis.	  	  	  Despite	  issues	  of	  legality,	  “the	  British	  aim	  of	  minimizing	  civilian	  casualties	  was	  commendable	  and	  largely	  effective”	  (Turner	  324).	  	  Safety	  aims	  were	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successful,	  but	  the	  British	  and	  French	  both	  failed	  in	  their	  goals	  of	  taking	  control	  of	  the	  Canal,	  removing	  Nasser	  from	  power,	  and	  having	  the	  international	  community	  agree	  with	  their	  actions.	  	  Instead,	  “London	  witnessed	  numerous	  demonstrations	  calling	  on	  the	  prime	  minister	  to	  cease	  the	  aggression”	  (Kingseed	  103).	  	  Eden	  did	  not	  receive	  the	  support	  at	  home	  or	  internationally	  that	  he	  had	  originally	  hoped	  for	  and	  had	  originally	  been	  offered.	  	  After	  the	  initial	  push	  for	  action	  against	  nationalization,	  support	  from	  the	  public	  and	  the	  British	  government	  began	  to	  reverse.	  	  It	  had	  become	  clear	  who	  drove	  the	  military	  policy	  when	  “criticism	  was	  directed	  primarily	  against	  Prime	  Minister	  Eden.	  	  There	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  general	  public	  and	  even	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  Cabinet	  did	  not	  support	  his	  Suez	  action”	  (Dayan	  244).	  	  The	  backlash	  was	  almost	  immediate	  for	  Britain’s	  military	  action.	  	  Instead	  of	  coming	  to	  its	  ally’s	  aid,	  the	  U.S.	  instead	  went	  to	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	   When	  Israel	  invaded,	  emergency	  meetings	  were	  convened	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  discuss	  how	  best	  to	  handle	  the	  situation.	  	  With	  a	  clear	  agreed	  upon	  policy	  “it	  was	  impossible	  for	  Eden	  to	  maintain	  credibly	  that	  an	  Anglo-­‐French	  force	  in	  the	  Canal	  Zone	  was	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  the	  continuance	  of	  hostilities	  between	  Israel	  and	  Egypt	  when	  both	  states	  had	  already	  accepted	  a	  ceasefire”	  (Bowie	  75).	  	  The	  U.N.	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  legal	  and	  logical	  instrument	  to	  end	  the	  military	  actions	  between	  Israel	  and	  Egypt,	  	  	   Before	  and	  during	  the	  Crisis,	  Britain	  looked	  to	  the	  United	  States	  for	  support	  and	  leadership.	  	  Eden	  felt	  that	  “the	  course	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  crisis	  was	  decided	  by	  the	  American	  attitude	  to	  it”	  (Eden	  458).	  	  Due	  to	  the	  American	  emphasis	  on	  negotiations	  and	  diplomacy,	  the	  British	  did	  not	  feel	  that	  the	  Americans	  took	  a	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leadership	  role.	  	  Britain	  blamed	  the	  United	  States	  somewhat	  for	  lack	  of	  American	  leadership	  and	  action	  during	  the	  Crisis.	  	  Instead	  of	  aligning	  with	  the	  Americans,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  aligned	  with	  France.	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France	  	  	  	  	   Unlike	  Great	  Britain,	  France	  did	  not	  have	  a	  presence	  in	  Egypt,	  having	  very	  little	  influence	  within	  the	  country.	  	  French	  interests	  primarily	  lay	  within	  Europe	  and	  Algeria.	  	  Due	  to	  Algeria’s	  proximity	  to	  Egypt	  and	  the	  Canal,	  France	  began	  to	  take	  notice	  of	  Nasser	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  nationalization.	  	  The	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Canal	  was	  seen	  as	  another	  “offence	  against	  France…	  -­‐	  the	  hijacking	  of	  a	  French	  enterprise	  and	  his	  support	  for	  the	  Algerian	  rebels	  who	  threatened	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Republic”	  (Turner	  254).	  	  France’s	  interests	  in	  Algeria	  made	  the	  government	  desire	  to	  overthrow	  Nasser	  for	  his	  support,	  rather	  than	  his	  takeover	  of	  a	  company	  that	  was	  headquartered	  in	  Paris.	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  British,	  Nasser’s	  move	  to	  nationalize	  the	  Canal	  gave	  France	  an	  opportunity	  to	  overthrow	  Nasser.	  	  In	  Algeria	  “for	  the	  army,	  Nasser	  was	  perfectly	  cast	  as	  the	  scapegoat	  for	  the	  failure	  to	  restore	  peace.	  	  Egypt’s	  role	  in	  Algeria	  matched	  that	  of	  China	  in	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam”	  (Turner	  193).	  	  To	  France,	  the	  removal	  of	  Nasser	  would	  not	  only	  solve	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  Canal,	  but	  also	  solve	  the	  difficulties	  they	  were	  having	  in	  Algeria.	  	  Military	  force	  could	  be	  used	  to	  “turn	  the	  nationalization	  weapon	  against	  Egypt	  and	  kill	  two	  birds	  with	  one	  stone:	  eliminate	  the	  budding	  dictator	  and	  settle	  the	  Algerian	  affair”	  (Louis	  137).	  	  Out	  of	  the	  three	  states	  that	  would	  ultimately	  invade	  Egypt,	  France	  was	  the	  surest	  of	  its	  actions	  from	  the	  beginning.	  	  	  	   Unlike	  the	  British	  government,	  the	  French	  government	  was	  united	  in	  its	  disdain	  for	  Nasser	  and	  its	  willingness	  to	  remove	  his	  government	  from	  power.	  	  Not	  too	  long	  after	  the	  nationalization	  was	  announced,	  “an	  idea	  took	  hold	  in	  the	  French	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Ministry	  of	  Defence	  for	  a	  joint	  French-­‐Israeli	  action	  against	  Egypt”	  (Turner	  262).	  	  The	  international	  community	  knew	  of	  the	  continued	  tension	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Israel,	  and	  the	  continued	  refusal	  to	  allow	  Israel	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  Canal.	  	  France	  had	  previously	  supplied	  weapons	  to	  Israel,	  creating	  a	  military	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  states	  before	  the	  nationalization.	  	  It	  had	  been	  kept	  quiet	  that	  “the	  French	  had	  for	  some	  time	  had	  been	  supplying	  the	  Israelis	  with	  far	  more	  military	  equipment	  than	  the	  United	  States	  had	  been	  aware,	  in	  clear	  violation	  of	  the	  Tripartite	  Declaration”	  (Kingseed	  104).	  	  Thus,	  France	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  military	  strength	  of	  the	  Israelis.	  	  Longtime	  ally,	  Great	  Britain,	  was	  also	  contacted	  in	  order	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  military	  action	  against	  Nasser.	  	   The	  French	  took	  part	  in	  both	  London	  Conferences,	  however	  the	  government	  was	  in	  agreement	  concerning	  the	  necessity	  of	  military	  action.	  	  Among	  the	  three	  tripartite	  countries	  “the	  French	  government	  emerges	  as	  anxious	  for	  close	  collaboration	  among	  the	  three	  allies;	  but	  the	  more	  the	  crisis	  evolved,	  the	  more	  France	  evinced	  the	  will	  to	  take	  action,	  in	  contrast	  with	  American	  prudence	  and	  British	  procrastination”	  (Louis	  138).	  	  The	  government’s	  certainty	  was	  in	  part	  due	  to	  skepticism	  regarding	  the	  United	  Nations	  process.	  	  With	  fewer	  countries	  involved,	  action	  would	  be	  swifter	  and	  could	  proceed	  with	  less	  debate.	  	  In	  contrast	  “any	  other	  action,	  such	  as	  debate	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  or	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  would	  be	  too	  slow	  and	  detrimental	  to	  the	  immediate	  solution	  to	  the	  problem”	  (Kingseed	  44).	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  French	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  the	  international	  process;	  however,	  their	  impatience	  to	  capitalize	  on	  the	  opportunity	  presented	  to	  them	  made	  them	  desirous	  to	  take	  quick	  action	  to	  achieve	  their	  ends.	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   France	  desired	  not	  only	  the	  involvement	  of	  Israel,	  but	  also	  the	  involvement	  of	  Britain.	  	  They	  both	  had	  the	  same	  goals	  once	  the	  nationalization	  was	  announced.	  	  With	  Nasser’s	  decision,	  “France	  and	  Great	  Britain	  were	  aghast	  at	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  waterway”	  (Kingseed	  43).	  	  Interest	  in	  the	  Canal	  was	  not	  all	  that	  the	  allies	  shared.	  	  Another	  connection	  was	  “the	  fact	  that	  the	  character	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  Company	  was	  French,	  with	  its	  headquarters	  in	  Paris,	  while	  the	  British	  government	  was	  the	  principal	  shareholder,	  made	  for	  an	  Anglo-­‐French	  alignment”	  (Louis	  112).	  	  Both	  country	  felt	  Egypt’s	  decision	  was	  illegal.	  	  But	  also	  felt	  that	  one	  country	  should	  nothave	  control	  over	  the	  clearly	  international	  waterway,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  internationally	  held	  Company	  that	  ran	  it.	  	  Removing	  Nasser	  from	  power	  would	  be	  an	  added	  bonus;	  ultimately	  “Britain	  and	  France	  wanted	  a	  Canal	  Authority	  capable	  of	  imposing	  its	  will	  on	  a	  recalcitrant	  Nasser”	  (Turner	  238).	  	  A	  Nasser	  moldable	  and	  willing	  to	  follow	  Western	  policy	  was	  the	  true	  desire.	  	  With	  each	  passing	  day	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  Nasser	  was	  the	  leader	  of	  a	  pro-­‐Arab,	  anti-­‐Western	  movement,	  and	  was	  unwilling	  to	  give	  back	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Canal.	  	  	  	  	   Military	  action	  became	  the	  clear	  answer	  to	  reach	  French	  goals,	  and	  connect	  with	  their	  interests	  in	  Algeria.	  	  Due	  to	  Britain’s	  hesitance,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  “mid-­‐October,	  if	  not	  sooner,	  [that]	  Mollet	  and	  Eden	  had	  reached	  firm	  agreement	  that	  Britain	  and	  France	  would	  act	  jointly	  in	  concert	  with	  Israel	  against	  Egypt”	  (Bowie	  52).	  	  Israel	  attacked	  first;	  then,	  as	  agreed	  upon,	  Britain	  and	  France	  offered	  both	  Israel	  and	  Egypt	  an	  ultimatum,	  which	  Egypt	  refused.	  	  As	  planned,	  both	  Britain	  and	  France	  became	  involved	  in	  the	  fighting,	  however	  “on	  the	  night	  of	  6	  November,	  the	  Anglo-­‐French	  Suez	  Expeditionary	  Force	  halted	  about	  20	  miles	  south	  of	  Port	  Said”.	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The	  cease-­‐fire	  agreed	  upon	  by	  the	  UN	  also	  required	  Britain	  and	  France	  to	  halt	  their	  actions.	  	  France	  was	  unsuccessful	  with	  its	  endeavor	  to	  effect	  change	  within	  Egypt,	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  desired	  impact	  on	  Algeria	  also	  was	  not	  forthcoming.	  	  Instead,	  the	  UN,	  led	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  became	  involved	  to	  ultimately	  not	  only	  halt	  Israel	  and	  Egypt,	  but	  Britain	  and	  France	  as	  well.	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The	  United	  States	  of	  America	  
	  	  	   After	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  international	  community	  changed	  dramatically,	  as	  did	  the	  United	  States’	  role	  within	  it.	  	  Despite	  the	  alliances	  made	  with	  Europe	  during	  the	  World	  Wars,	  historically	  the	  United	  States	  was	  against	  colonialism	  and	  supported	  the	  disbandment	  of	  colonial	  holdings,	  including	  Britain’s	  hold	  on	  Egypt.	  	  Also,	  unlike	  their	  Western	  allies,	  “the	  American	  statesmen	  had	  a	  certain	  sense	  of	  commitment	  to	  the	  state	  of	  Israel,	  which	  was	  hardly	  prevalent	  among	  their	  British	  colleagues”	  (Louis	  93).	  	  Despite	  their	  differences	  and	  conflicting	  colonial	  attitudes,	  America	  and	  President	  Eisenhower	  had	  growing	  tensions	  with	  Nasser	  and	  his	  policies.	  	  This	  apprehension	  began	  to	  play	  out	  in	  discussions	  concerning	  the	  funding	  of	  the	  Aswan	  High	  Dam.	  	   In	  order	  to	  build	  the	  Dam,	  great	  amounts	  of	  money	  were	  required	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Americans	  were	  willing	  to	  help	  pay,	  but	  quickly	  grew	  tired	  of	  Nasser’s	  continued	  refusal	  to	  the	  terms	  presented	  by	  the	  Western	  powers	  and	  the	  World	  Bank.	  	  After	  months	  of	  negotiations,	  “when	  Nasser	  countered	  with	  proposals	  that	  were	  unacceptable	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  Great	  Britain,	  and	  the	  World	  Bank,	  Eisenhower	  considered	  the	  matter	  dead	  for	  all	  practical	  purposes”	  (Kingseed	  37).	  	  The	  American	  Congress	  as	  well	  as	  the	  American	  people	  were	  no	  longer	  willing	  to	  fund	  the	  great	  expense	  of	  the	  Dam.	  	  After	  difficult	  negotiations	  Eisenhower	  was	  unwilling	  to	  push	  the	  issue.	  	  	  This	  was	  not	  the	  only	  cause	  for	  a	  difficult	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Egypt,	  “the	  Czech	  arms	  deal,	  coupled	  with	  Nasser’s	  continued	  vociferous	  verbal	  attacks	  on	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact,	  convinced	  Eisenhower	  that	  Nasser	  was	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untrustworthy	  and	  unpredictable”	  (Kingseed	  33).	  	  Unlike	  Britain	  and	  France	  however,	  this	  did	  not	  cause	  Eisenhower	  to	  desire	  Nasser’s	  complete	  removal	  from	  government.	  	  Rather,	  Cold	  War	  tensions	  were	  the	  larger	  issues,	  with	  the	  United	  States	  attempting	  to	  limit	  the	  influence	  and	  power	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  Also,	  due	  to	  the	  upcoming	  presidential	  election,	  Eisenhower	  and	  his	  administration	  were	  under	  greater	  scrutiny	  for	  their	  actions	  to	  the	  American	  people.	  	  	  	   Not	  only	  Eisenhower,	  but	  also	  the	  international	  community	  knew	  of	  the	  upcoming	  election.	  	  Britain,	  France,	  and	  Israel	  believed	  that	  the	  election	  would	  tie	  Eisenhower’s	  political	  hands	  from	  retaliating	  against	  their	  planned	  military	  attack.	  	  However,	  as	  Eisenhower	  stated	  “Ben	  Gurion	  should	  not	  make	  any	  grave	  mistakes	  based	  upon	  his	  belief	  that	  winning	  a	  domestic	  election	  is	  as	  important	  to	  us	  as	  preserving	  and	  protecting	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  other	  nations	  of	  the	  free	  world	  in	  that	  region”	  (Eisenhower	  332).	  	  Despite	  his	  desire	  to	  be	  re-­‐elected,	  Eisenhower	  was	  concentrated	  on	  his	  presidency	  and	  his	  duty	  to	  the	  international	  community.	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  election	  did	  not	  add	  additional	  stress	  to	  Eisenhower;	  it	  clearly	  was	  a	  consideration.	  	  However,	  despite	  the	  closeness	  between	  the	  Crisis	  and	  the	  election,	  Eisenhower	  ultimately	  chose	  international	  security,	  returning	  to	  Washington	  from	  the	  campaign	  trail	  as	  events	  began	  to	  quickly	  escalate	  (Kingseed	  98).	  	  The	  election	  did	  place	  pressure	  on	  the	  administration	  to	  uphold	  its	  desire	  to	  solve	  the	  nationalization	  tensions	  through	  peaceful	  means.	  	  This	  was	  felt	  throughout	  the	  entire	  administration,	  “with	  a	  presidential	  election	  barely	  two	  months	  away,	  Dulles	  was	  under	  more	  than	  usual	  pressure	  to	  come	  up	  with	  an	  idea	  that	  would	  at	  least	  keep	  in	  prospect	  a	  peaceful	  solution”	  (Turner	  250).	  	  A	  diplomatic	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solution	  was	  not	  only	  to	  stop	  a	  war	  from	  occurring	  and	  stopping	  the	  flow	  of	  oil,	  but	  also	  the	  greater	  imperative	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  not	  join	  in	  on	  the	  fighting	  and	  insert	  their	  influence	  into	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  However,	  finding	  a	  peaceful	  solution	  was	  not	  the	  leadership	  role	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  was	  expecting	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  	   In	  a	  partnership	  with	  Great	  Britain,	  two	  London	  Conferences	  were	  set	  up	  along	  with	  the	  maritime	  powers	  to	  discuss	  a	  solution	  that	  all	  parties	  could	  agree	  to.	  	  While	  Egypt	  did	  not	  send	  direct	  counsel,	  Egypt’s	  interests	  were	  still	  represented	  by	  other	  parties	  that	  did	  attend.	  	  After	  discussions	  during	  both	  conferences	  and	  ultimately	  deciding	  upon	  a	  Canal	  User’s	  Association	  to	  control	  the	  Canal,	  the	  agreement	  was	  brought	  to	  Egypt.	  	  However	  once	  brought	  to	  his	  attention,	  “Nasser	  had	  said	  that	  he	  would	  regard	  the	  payment	  by	  ship	  owners	  of	  the	  dues	  to	  SCUA	  as	  a	  hostile	  act”	  (Lloyd	  180).	  	  Despite	  the	  agreement	  between	  all	  other	  maritime	  powers,	  Egypt	  was	  unwilling	  to	  give	  up	  control	  of	  the	  Canal	  to	  an	  international	  body.	  	  This	  did	  not	  end	  Eisenhower’s	  hopes	  for	  a	  peaceful	  solution.	  	   Eden	  was	  clear	  with	  Eisenhower	  from	  the	  beginning	  about	  his	  willingness	  to	  consider	  a	  military	  option,	  despite	  America’s	  protests.	  	  This	  placed	  the	  United	  States	  in	  a	  tight	  political	  space	  between	  its	  relationship	  with	  Great	  Britain,	  and	  its	  policy	  of	  a	  diplomatic	  solution.	  	  In	  full	  knowledge	  of	  this	  conflict,	  “the	  President	  insisted	  that,	  however	  unhappy	  about	  helping	  Egypt,	  the	  United	  States	  must	  fulfill	  its	  pledged	  under	  the	  Tripartite	  Declaration	  to	  aid	  the	  victim	  of	  aggression”	  (Louis	  208).	  	  Once	  Great	  Britain,	  France	  and	  Israel	  committed	  to	  military	  retaliation,	  Eisenhower	  was	  kept	  in	  the	  dark.	  	  Britain’s	  connection	  was	  not	  supposed	  to	  be	  known	  by	  the	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international	  community,	  in	  particular	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Despite	  the	  overseas	  silence,	  Eisenhower	  still	  believed	  that	  “the	  Anglo-­‐American	  special	  relationship	  would	  soon	  be	  back	  on	  track	  was	  shattered	  when	  reports	  started	  coming	  through	  of	  a	  build-­‐up	  in	  Israel,	  along	  with	  rumours	  that	  somehow	  Britain	  and	  France	  were	  involved”	  (Turner	  301).	  	  Eden	  and	  Eisenhower’s	  personal	  relationship	  also	  led	  to	  the	  U.S.’s	  misperception	  of	  how	  far	  Great	  Britain	  was	  willing	  to	  push	  the	  issue	  of	  international	  control.	  	  	  Until	  he	  had	  knowledge	  of	  his	  allies’	  betrayal,	  “Eisenhower	  remained	  convinced	  that	  he	  had	  done	  all	  in	  his	  power	  to	  prevent	  armed	  hostilities	  in	  the	  Suez	  region”	  (Kingseed	  80).	  	  He	  would	  continue	  to	  feel	  confident	  until	  intelligence	  came	  in	  of	  the	  military	  mobilization	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  making	  clear	  attack	  was	  imminent.	  	  With	  this	  knowledge	  Eisenhower	  needed	  to	  take	  action.	  	   With	  only	  Israeli	  forces	  invading	  Egypt,	  Britain	  and	  France’s	  role	  in	  the	  planning	  was	  still	  unknown	  to	  the	  Americans.	  	  Knowing	  that	  he	  needed	  to	  take	  immediate	  action	  and	  “after	  hearing	  the	  recommendations	  of	  his	  civilian	  and	  military	  advisers,	  Eisenhower	  made	  the	  decisions	  to	  bring	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  United	  Nations”	  (Kingseed	  89).	  	  Since	  Britain’s	  involvement	  was	  still	  unknown	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  Eisenhower	  invited	  its	  historical	  ally	  to	  go	  before	  the	  Security	  Council	  in	  order	  to	  end	  the	  hostilities	  (Kingseed	  90).	  	  Eisenhower	  did	  not	  consider	  gathering	  American	  forces	  to	  end	  the	  hostilities,	  or	  joining	  in	  when	  France	  and	  Britain	  invaded,	  once	  their	  ultimatum	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  Egyptians.	  	  However,	  “the	  entry	  of	  America’s	  most	  trusted	  allies	  into	  the	  conflict	  seemed	  to	  make	  a	  mockery	  of	  the	  president’s	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  of	  the	  crisis”	  (Kingseed	  102).	  	  Despite	  the	  embarrassment,	  Eisenhower	  continued	  to	  pursue	  a	  ceasefire	  through	  international	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means,	  instead	  of	  coming	  to	  Britain	  and	  France’s	  aid	  as	  in	  the	  World	  Wars,	  they	  had	  previously	  predicted	  he	  would.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  America’s	  previous	  fears	  of	  the	  conflict,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  in	  agreement	  to	  ending	  the	  hostilities.	  	   Once	  military	  actions	  were	  taken,	  America	  was	  clear	  in	  its	  disapproval.	  	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  hostilities	  had	  occurred	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  truly	  an	  actor	  within	  the	  Crisis.	  	  Eisenhower	  and	  his	  administration	  “did	  not	  want	  to	  see	  the	  U.N.	  dragged	  into	  the	  crisis	  prematurely	  and	  be	  unable	  to	  resolve	  it	  (Bowie	  33).	  	  The	  organization	  was	  still	  young;	  any	  amount	  of	  failure	  might	  result	  in	  lessening	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  organization	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  work	  effectively.	  	  With	  the	  invasion	  of	  Israel,	  and	  no	  end	  in	  sight,	  the	  time	  had	  come	  for	  the	  U.N.	  to	  act	  as	  it	  was	  designed	  to.	  	  Despite	  their	  betrayal,	  “Eisenhower	  carefully	  managed	  the	  UN	  resolutions	  to	  avoid	  formal	  sanctions	  against	  Britain,	  France,	  and	  Israel”	  (Louis	  212).	  	  The	  U.S.	  was	  authorizing	  its	  allies	  a	  way	  to	  get	  out	  quickly	  and	  without	  long-­‐term	  economic	  harm	  to	  their	  people.	  	  	  While	  clearly	  deceived,	  Eisenhower	  was	  able	  to	  honor	  his	  policy	  of	  not	  becoming	  militarily	  involved	  in	  the	  fighting	  and	  was	  reelected.	  	  He	  was	  able	  to	  utilize	  the	  United	  Nations	  successfully,	  and	  quickly	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  the	  fighting	  without	  lasting	  harm.	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The	  United	  Nations	  	  	  	  	   In	  the	  Post-­‐World	  War	  II	  world,	  an	  international	  organization	  was	  created	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  lasting	  peace	  and	  stop	  wrongful	  aggression.	  	  With	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  an	  arena	  for	  country	  disputes,	  the	  world	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  threatened	  by	  aggression.	  	  As	  international	  law	  became	  defined,	  “the	  grounds	  for	  using	  force	  had	  been	  drastically	  narrowed	  to	  self-­‐defence,	  forcible	  denial	  of	  rights,	  and	  protection	  of	  nationals”	  (Louis	  114).	  	  This	  limited	  each	  country’s	  ability	  to	  declare	  war	  against	  another.	  	  Legal	  and	  justified	  reasons	  for	  military	  aggression	  made	  diplomacy	  necessary	  before	  any	  action	  to	  be	  taken,	  allowing	  the	  UN	  to	  be	  the	  stage	  for	  these	  talks.	  	  The	  youth	  and	  inexperience	  of	  the	  organization	  made	  even	  the	  countries	  that	  were	  fully	  supportive	  of	  the	  UN	  hesitant	  to	  utilize	  it.	  	  If	  the	  UN	  were	  to	  fail	  in	  its	  early	  stages,	  not	  only	  hope	  for	  peace,	  but	  also	  the	  organization	  itself	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  seen	  as	  viable.	  	  Despite	  these	  fears,	  the	  UN	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  end	  the	  Suez	  Crisis.	  	  	  President	  Nasser’s	  decision	  to	  nationalize	  the	  Canal	  earlier	  than	  the	  agreement	  called	  for	  raising	  questions	  regarding	  the	  legality	  of	  his	  actions.	  	  Before	  the	  announcement	  “it	  did	  not	  pass	  notice	  that	  Egypt	  was	  in	  violation	  of	  a	  1951	  UN	  resolution	  which	  called	  for	  the	  freedom	  of	  navigation	  for	  Israeli	  vessels”	  (Turner	  259).	  	  The	  Canal	  under	  national	  control	  continued	  this	  violation.	  	  However,	  there	  was	  no	  action	  within	  the	  UN	  to	  allow	  Israel	  to	  travel	  through	  the	  Canal	  as	  it	  legally	  was	  allowed	  to.	  	  Regional	  tensions	  concerning	  Israel’s	  existence,	  however,	  explain	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other	  states	  hesitance	  to	  pursue	  the	  matter	  and	  create	  a	  larger	  issue.	  	  These	  legal	  issues	  offered	  a	  justification	  for	  some	  for	  Israel’s	  eventual	  actions.	  	  	  The	  two	  major	  bodies	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  were	  both	  called	  upon	  in	  order	  to	  end	  the	  conflict.	  	  The	  Security	  Council,	  the	  only	  binding	  body	  at	  the	  UN,	  was	  the	  main	  site	  for	  resolution	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  Unfortunately,	  more	  than	  half	  the	  countries	  awarded	  veto	  power	  were	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  Crisis.	  	  The	  other	  body	  was	  the	  General	  Assembly	  Plenary.	  	  While	  its	  decisions	  are	  non-­‐binding,	  each	  country	  receives	  an	  equal	  vote	  and	  is	  able	  to	  speak	  their	  opinion,	  creating	  an	  international	  consensus	  on	  the	  issue	  at	  hand.	  	  	  The	  first	  attempt	  to	  solve	  the	  Crisis	  was	  vetoed	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  taking	  Egypt’s	  side.	  	  Once	  military	  aggression	  began	  the	  discussion	  again	  took	  place	  “at	  the	  UN,	  where	  there	  was	  already	  talk	  of	  a	  three-­‐power	  collusion	  to	  bring	  about	  Nasser’s	  downfall,	  an	  America-­‐led	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  calling	  for	  an	  immediate	  ceasefire	  was	  vetoed	  by	  Britain	  and	  France”	  (Turner	  314).	  	  This	  allowed	  Britain	  and	  France	  to	  honor	  their	  ultimatum	  and	  invade,	  without	  being	  in	  violation	  of	  a	  Security	  Council	  resolution.	  	  With	  this	  second	  use	  of	  a	  veto	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  little	  would	  be	  completed	  in	  the	  Security	  Council.	  	   Other	  options	  within	  the	  organization	  were	  then	  considered	  in	  order	  to	  still	  find	  a	  resolution	  within	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  The	  Soviet	  Union,	  France,	  and	  Britain’s	  actions	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  “the	  next	  move…was	  to	  refer	  the	  whole	  issue	  to	  an	  emergency	  session	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  where	  the	  veto	  could	  not	  be	  exercised”	  (Turner	  314).	  	  Action	  needed	  to	  be	  taken,	  and	  a	  roundabout	  route	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  success	  in	  utilizing	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  	  The	  situation	  within	  the	  organization	  was	  tedious	  as	  well.	  	  At	  the	  time,	  “the	  U.N.’s	  inability	  to	  halt	  Soviet	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intervention	  in	  Hungary	  was	  already	  damaging	  its	  standing.	  	  An	  added	  failure	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  Suez	  attack	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  Charter	  could	  discredit	  it	  utterly”	  (Bowie	  62).	  	  Agreement	  within	  the	  General	  Assembly	  was	  a	  requirement	  for	  a	  resolution	  to	  be	  found,	  and	  for	  continued	  trust	  in	  the	  UN.	  	  Any	  failure	  and	  the	  Crisis	  could	  last	  for	  an	  unforeseen	  amount	  of	  time,	  and	  no	  other	  international	  conflicts	  would	  be	  brought	  before	  the	  UN	  for	  a	  solution	  to	  be	  found.	  	  	  	   Despite	  the	  problems	  within	  the	  Security	  Council,	  the	  decision	  to	  bring	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly	  was	  successful.	  	  Consensus	  surrounded	  “the	  US	  resolution,	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  on	  2	  November”	  (Louis	  211).	  	  While	  having	  an	  agreement	  among	  the	  international	  community	  was	  a	  great	  improvement	  over	  the	  standstill	  caused	  by	  the	  veto,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  resolution	  was	  non-­‐binding,	  meaning	  that	  there	  was	  no	  enforcement	  mechanism.	  	  However,	  despite	  the	  non-­‐binding	  nature,	  the	  resolution	  was	  triumphant	  in	  ending	  the	  Crisis.	  	  By	  November	  6th	  all	  parties	  involved	  agreed	  to	  the	  resolution,	  which	  “urged	  an	  immediate	  cease-­‐fire,	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  all	  forces	  behind	  the	  armistice	  lines,	  a	  ban	  on	  all	  military	  aid	  to	  the	  belligerents,	  and	  action	  to	  reopen	  the	  Suez	  Canal,	  which	  the	  Egyptians	  had	  blocked	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  war”	  (Kingseed	  110).	  	  For	  a	  non-­‐binding	  resolution	  to	  have	  such	  international	  consensus	  behind	  it	  that	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  was	  declared	  without	  a	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  was	  a	  major	  success	  for	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  	  The	  cease-­‐fire	  was	  not	  the	  only	  agreement	  within	  the	  resolution.	  	  During	  the	  discussions	  within	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  it	  was	  decided	  upon	  that	  a	  force	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  Israelis,	  and	  to	  ensure	  peace	  within	  the	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   The	  inflexible	  position	  of	  the	  multiple	  actors	  during	  the	  Suez	  Crisis	  made	  military	  aggression	  all	  the	  more	  precarious	  within	  a	  post-­‐Hitler	  world.	  	  Britain	  and	  France	  attempted	  to	  make	  multiple	  connections	  between	  Nasser	  and	  Hitler	  in	  order	  to	  engage	  the	  United	  States	  in	  their	  endeavor.	  	  Instead	  Eisenhower	  searched	  for	  a	  diplomatic	  solution	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  infiltrate	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  No	  matter	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  countries	  involved,	  the	  final	  solution	  was	  only	  found	  within	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  Issues	  of	  sovereignty	  collided	  with	  international	  law	  erupting	  in	  a	  military	  attack	  that	  was	  ultimately	  unsuccessful	  in	  serving	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  aggressors.	  	  	  	   Nasser’s	  decision	  to	  nationalize	  the	  Canal,	  while	  thought	  out,	  was	  clearly	  a	  controversial	  act.	  	  He	  was	  looking	  for	  this	  attention	  to	  ensure	  to	  repair	  his	  ego	  from	  the	  loss	  of	  Western	  support	  for	  the	  Aswan	  High	  Dam.	  	  The	  act	  also	  brought	  attention	  to	  Egypt	  on	  the	  international	  stage,	  and	  would	  show	  Egypt’s	  power	  in	  successfully	  running	  the	  Canal	  as	  it	  had	  been	  before	  Nasser’s	  announcement.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  Crisis	  made	  Egypt	  appear	  as	  a	  victim	  against	  Britain	  and	  France’s	  unnecessary	  aggression.	  	  Due	  to	  Egypt’s	  continued	  violation	  of	  international,	  while	  military	  aggression	  was	  not	  seen	  as	  necessary,	  the	  Israeli	  government’s	  actions	  were	  considered	  somewhat	  justified.	  	  	  	   Despite	  their	  disagreement	  over	  control	  of	  the	  Canal,	  both	  Eden	  and	  Nasser	  had	  a	  commonality	  during	  the	  Crisis.	  	  Both	  blamed	  the	  United	  States	  for	  not	  being	  the	  leaders	  the	  world	  had	  come	  to	  expect	  the	  superpower	  to	  be.	  	  Eden	  had	  hoped	  that	  Eisenhower	  would	  react	  as	  the	  government	  had	  done	  historically	  during	  both	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World	  Wars.	  	  While	  Eden	  and	  Nasser	  overestimated	  America’s	  willingness	  to	  address	  the	  Crisis	  militarily,	  Eisenhower	  overestimated	  his	  personal	  relationship	  with	  Eden.	  	  Eisenhower	  did	  not	  believe	  until	  it	  became	  painfully	  obvious	  that	  Eden	  would	  resort	  to	  aggression	  despite	  his	  friend	  and	  ally’s	  refusal.	  	  The	  conflict	  between	  the	  strong	  personalities	  during	  the	  Crisis	  halted	  vital	  communication	  making	  diplomacy	  an	  almost	  impossible	  solution.	  	  	   Veto	  power	  also	  allowed	  these	  powers	  to	  stop	  a	  binding	  resolution	  from	  ending	  the	  Crisis	  before	  Britain	  and	  France	  entered	  the	  aggression.	  	  However,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  international	  community	  reached	  a	  consensus	  through	  the	  General	  Assembly	  in	  order	  for	  the	  invading	  parties	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  and	  creating	  the	  United	  Nations	  Emergency	  Force.	  	  Despite	  obstacles	  the	  international	  organization	  was	  able	  to	  halt	  the	  Crisis	  quickly	  and	  create	  a	  force	  to	  enforce	  the	  removal	  of	  troops.	  	  The	  organization	  was	  successful	  despite	  the	  strong	  personalities	  and	  utilization	  of	  the	  veto,	  showing	  its	  strength	  and	  ability	  to	  achieve	  the	  goals	  of	  its	  creation.	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